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I. Introduction 
 
Financing the European Union (EU or Union) appears to be the next hot topic of debate 
for the EU’s Member States. A financial transaction tax (FTT), which is a tax placed on 
the transactions of stocks, bonds, and derivative products,2 is one of the proposed 
financing options. As proposed by the European Commission (Commission), financial 
institutions, on both sides of the transaction, would be liable for this tax. The 
Commission has suggested a 0.1% tax rate for the transactions of bonds and shares and 
0.01% for derivative products, and some Member States have already agreed to this 
proposal.3 Under the proposal, Member States are supposed to contribute two-thirds of 
their nationally-collected FTT revenue to the EU budget. 
 
The European Council, consisting of heads of states and the President of the European 
Commission, accepted the Commission’s plan for the EU budget 2014-2020 on February 
8, 2013. However, the Council left the FTT proposal open for further discussion.4 11 of 
the 27 EU Member States have already approved the FTT, but the tax does have fervent 
opponents like the United Kingdom.  
 
This paper is an attempt to assess the proposed tax from the point of view of the EU’s 
“Better Regulation” agenda. “Better Regulation is a broad strategy to improve the 
regulatory environment in Europe” by, among other methods, “improv[ing] the quality of 
new legislation by better evaluating its likely economic, social and environmental 
impacts.”5 The article asks whether the FTT adheres to the Commission’s standards as 
stated in the Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking.6 
 
 
                                                 
1 Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Tax Law and  Economics, Faculty of Law, Leiden 
University, The Netherlands. 
2 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax 
and amending Directive 2008/7/EC, Brussels, 28.9.2011, COM(2011) 594 final. 
3 European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union, 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/index_en.htm. 
4 European Council, Conclusions (Multiannual Financial Framework), EUCO 37/13, Brussels (8 February 
2013). 
5 European Commission. What is better regulation?, 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/br_what_en.htm. 
6 European Commission, European Parliament and Council of Ministers, Inter-Institutional Agreement on 
Better Lawmaking, OJ 2003 C 321/01. 
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II. The EU Budget 
 
Budgetary considerations have played an important role in the history of the EU. One of 
the main controversies was and still is about whether the EU should have its own 
resources. The Treaty of Rome (Treaty), signed in 1957, envisaged a transition period 
lasting until 1970 during which the EU’s financing consisted of Member States’ 
contributions. According to Article 201 of the Treaty, a system of “own resources,” or 
self-financing, was to be introduced at the end of the transition period. From 1980 
onwards, the Union had three sources of self-financing: (1) tariffs on manufactured 
imports from non-Member countries, (2) levies on agricultural imports from the rest of 
the world, and (3) a share of the total Value Added Tax (a broadly based consumption tax 
assessed on the value added to goods and services) levied by the Member States. 
However, in 1988, due to increasing free trade and the subsequently lower tariffs, as well 
as rising expenditures, the Union introduced a fourth source of revenue: a share (currently 
at 1.05%) of the Gross National Income (GNI) of each State. Today, contributions that 
are mobilized through the fourth source account for 75% of the total revenue of the EU, 
which runs counter to the philosophy behind the Treaty. Hence, reform of the EU’s 
revenue generation mechanisms has become central to the debate about the future of the 
EU budget.7 The proposed FTT is at the core of this debate, as the tax would cut the 
Member States’ GNI-based contributions.  
 
 
III. The EU’s Better Regulation Principles and the FTT 
 
According to the European Commission, European Parliament, and the Council of 
Ministers, the quality of lawmaking within the Union depends on the quality of the 
legislative process. The most relevant factors in determining and measuring quality are 
how the social process and its related content are guaranteed: did all affected parties 
participate in the legislative process, and if so to what extent were their expectations 
fulfilled? Consideration should also be given to the economic, social, and environmental 
impact of a proposed law. An impact assessment is essential for a major policy proposal 
to be weighed effectively with a knowledge-based approach and alternatives to regulation 
to be examined as appropriate. Finally, the Commission is obligated to take into account 
both citizens’ and corporations’ views under the Better Regulation agenda.8  
 
(A) Visibility 
Over the years, the Union has evolved from a bond between states to a cooperation 
between the Union and its citizens. An EU tax is supposed to establish a visible link 
                                                 
7 Senior Nello, S. The European Union: Economics, Policies and History (2012). 
8 European Commission, Better Regulation, http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm. 
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between the two.9 However, studies show that the FTT, as an implicit tax, lacks visibility 
to EU citizens.10 Rather, the FTT is visible only to corporations. 
 
Additionally, the FTT’s proponents gave two decisive reasons in favor of the tax – (1) the 
responsibility of the financial sector for the financial crisis of 2008 (akin to the so-called 
“polluter pays principle” in environmental law); and (2) high popular support from 
citizens for the idea that the financial sector should pay – that have nothing to do with 
visibility. In short, these reasons are probably just ad hoc populist criteria that should 
never serve as rationale for EU policies.  
 
(B) Juste retour 
Another important reason for the Union to introduce an EU tax is to counter the juste 
retour behavior of the Member States: States tend to favor expenditures that improve 
their net national benefits, rather than those with the greatest value added for the EU as a 
whole. Such purely self-interested behavior has been shown to be the result of the 
dominant way for financing the EU – with national, GNI-based contributions. This 
method of financing “places disproportionate emphasis on net balances between Member 
States[,] thus contradicting the principle of EU solidarity, diluting the European common 
interest and largely ignoring European added value.”11 Is juste retour behavior to blame 
for its supposed negative affect on the EU budget, though?   
 
The history of the EU budget shows that national net interests, not solidarity, made the 
formation of the Union in 1957 possible. From that point until the late 1960s, it became 
institutionalized practice for Member States to plant national flags on EU expenditures 
and to attempt to strike a balance between their contributions to and the expenditures of 
the EU. It was generally accepted that if not for this behavior, the States involved would 
not have been able to come to any agreement. As history demonstrates, the EU budget 
does not facilitate solidarity between the States at all.  
 
Therefore, the Commission should not contest the juste retour behavior of the States. “It 
is not the business of the science of public finance and of tax legislation to do away with 
the egotism of the social classes, but to assign it its proper place as a safeguard of 
legitimate particular interests,” said the economist Knut Wicksell.12 He argued for a 
system of earmarked taxes and expenditures. Surprisingly, and probably nolens volens for 
                                                 
9 European Commission, Commission report on the operation of the own resource system, 505 final (2004); 
European Parliament, On the future of the European Union’s own resources (2006/2205 (INI)), Rapporteur 
A. Lamassoure (2007). 
10 Begg, I., H. Enderlein, J. Le Cacheux, & M. Mrak, Financing the European Union Budget. Brussels: 
European Commission (2008); Cattoir, P., ‘Tax-based EU own resources: An assessment.’ Working Paper 
no.1. European Commission (2004). 
11 European Commission, A Budget for Europe 2020, Brussels, 29.6.2011, COM(2011) 500 final. 
12 Wicksell, K., Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen  (1896) (Nabu Public Domain Reprint, 2010). 
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the Commission, letting the financial sector pay for past or future financial crises13 is in 
line with the thinking behind juste retour. In short, the FTT, mutatis mutandis, essentially 
puts the EU back to where it was in the first ten years of its existence.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
How does the FTT score from the point of view of the Better Regulation agenda? First, it 
certainly is not a visible tax. If visibility is not improved, then the present GNI-based 
contribution system should be allowed to continue as is; this system is seen as a simple 
and fair way of financing. Second, the FTT is an earmarked tax. This contradicts the goal 
of the Union to fight juste retour behavior. In the past, however, the juste retour principle 
has proven to be a workable strategy. In sum, there is room for improvement in molding 
the Financial Transaction Tax.  
                                                 
13 European Commission, Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, Brussels, 28.9.2011, SEC(2011) 
1103 final.  
